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NATHAN GLAZERt
Gary Orfield is to be commended for his indefatigability, indeed
his relentlessness, in continuing to pursue an issue of enormous
importance on which most of us-analysts, governments, federal,
state, and local officials, lawyers, bureaucrats, scholars, and even
many erstwhile civil rights activists-have given up.' That issue is
the desegregation of the American public school and the American
neighborhood. No one need argue the importance of this end.
Blacks are by far the most segregated of ethnic and racial groups,
as Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton demonstrated in their
important book American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the
Underclass.2
I feel a special responsibility for bearing with this issue because
many years ago I took the position that black separation from whites
would in time be mitigated just the way the concentration of first-
generation immigrants in urban ghettoes was diluted, that indeed
the degree of separation of blacks from whites in northern multi-
ethnic cities was not much greater than that of European ethnic
groups from native whites of longer antecedents.' I believed-and
still in measure do-that black concentration and segregation was
based not only on discrimination, public and private, but on the
same factors that had created first-generation and maintained
second- and third-generation concentrations of European ethnic
groups in northern cities. It could be argued in the 1960s and
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1970s that blacks in northern cities were roughly in the same
position as European ethnic groups thirty or forty years earlier.
4
After all, although there had been blacks in northern cities from
their founding, the mass migration of blacks into northern cities did
not take place until the 1920s, as mass European immigration was
coming to an end. It was not unreasonable to believe in the 1960s,
with black migration still going on and with long-established
discriminatory patterns being broken by law and social change, that
black concentration was a reflection of the recency of their
migration. From the northern urban point of view, blacks were still
a first- and second-generation ethnic group.5
History has shown that this point of view was wrong. In fact, the
degree of residential separation of African-Americans is quite out
of the ballpark when we compare it with the more modest and
temporary concentrations of European ethnic groups.6 Perhaps I
can defend the error: no one of good will could have predicted in
1965, in the wake of the passage of a major civil rights bill, that
thirty years later blacks would be so fully separated from whites.
Certainly this situation, responsible for so many ills-the creation in
poor black areas of a distinctive and dysgenic culture, even of a
separation in language-demands our most intense concern. I agree
with Gary Orfield that we have no more serious domestic problem.
I agree, too, with his argument that residential concentration
and school concentration are closely related. One leads to the
other, and both lead to the same disturbing results. If a school goes
mostly black, whites will not be willing to move into the neighbor-
hood, and the school is on the road to becoming all black. If a
neighborhood goes mostly black, whites will not be as interested in
sending their children to a school in that neighborhood.
There are, nevertheless, a number of points on which I take
issue with Orfield. The first is on responsibility, public and private,
for segregation. (Decades ago, I tried to reserve the term "segrega-
tion" for direct state- or community-ordered or imposed segregation
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and to use "concentration" or some other word for those concentra-
tions, often reaching 100%, which were not ordered by any public
authority." This is the distinction that was once made between de
jure and defacto segregation. But we can't argue with word usage.
Both "segregation" and "concentration" are now simply "segrega-
tion," tout court.) Responsibility is important legally because it
determines whether and what kinds of remedies can be ordered. It
is also important politically and socially. It determines whether
those on whom the burden for correcting this matter is placed will
view that burden as fair.
So who bears the guilt for this abnormal degree of segregation?
Is it public action or private action? If it is private, does that let the
public authorities off the hook, does that limit the remedy? For
public school segregation, one can almost always make some kind
of case that the segregation is the responsibility of public authori-
ties, and this is the kind of case Gary Orfield makes. After all, the
school board is a public body, and students are assigned to schools.
If the school board uses a simple district-zoning, student-assignment
plan and knows that blacks are concentrated, one can argue a case
of knowing segregation, even if the plan was in existence long
before there were many blacks to be affected by it. If the school
board creates a mixed district of blacks and whites, that can also be
a case of knowing segregation-they should know, Gary Orfield
argues, that black areas expand and whites will leave if there are too
many blacks.' If the authorities build a school in a black district
because it seems to be needed to relieve overcrowding, that action
may be attacked as motivated by a segregatory intent. If they close
down schools in black neighborhoods and build only in white
neighborhoods because whites won't go to black neighborhood
schools (whereas blacks will go to white neighborhood schools), they
are clearly discriminating against black neighborhoods, depriving
them of schools, and forcing black students to travel further than
white students to get to school.
Anyone working in this field will be bemused at the various
arguments that have been used to prove public intent to segregate.
It is a case of "damned if you do and damned if you don't," in
which contradictory actions can both be used to prove segregatory
intent. This is not responsibility or fault or blame in the way
See GLAZER, supra note 3, at 130-67.
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ordinary people understand it, and, understandably, if the authori-
ties feel they have been unfairly saddled with responsibility, they will
resist remedies that are unpleasant to them.
The legal arguments over school desegregation do not come to
grips with the fact that many white parents do want to separate their
children from black children, will not be happy if their children go
to black majority schools (and this is often, in many school districts,
the best one can do in desegregation), and will be worried that,
even if blacks are not a majority in schools to which their children
are assigned, they will soon become a majority. Their response to
attempts to desegregate schools is often to resort to public action,
pressuring school boards-in which case, there is a basis for a legal
sanction. Far more often, however, they take private action-they
move away. Is this a cause for public action? The same motives and
fears have led to the same result, but if they act through public
bodies, a remedy is available; if they act privately, as they often do,
it is harder to see what can be done, but one can go through legal
contortions, as described above, to show that the school board
should have done something and, if it did nothing, has violated
constitutional rights. One might take the position that racist
parents should be subjected to some public sanction. But they
move away for many reasons. They think the quality of education
or discipline in the school will decline. They fear for the physical
safety of their children. Or they fear their children will pick up bad
language habits. Or maybe they just don't like blacks. How can we
separate legitimate reasons for moving away, which make it possible
for the black concentration to increase, from purely race-based
reasons? Orfield argues we can't, and, therefore, just about
anything that creates the black ghetto is constitutionally suspect and
some appropriate remedy is required.' That remedy must penalize
whites who have moved away. They should not, as a result of
moving, have the reward of being able to send their children to
public schools with small numbers of, or no, blacks. I think such an
argument is far too expansive. It places the responsibility for the
expansion of the ghetto, from a legal point of view, entirely on the
whites and jumbles together all the reasons they leave some
communities and move to the communities they prefer into one
reason: racism. It assumes that great consequences-and the
separation of blacks is a great consequence-come from great causes
9 See Orfield, Abstract, supra note 1, at 1401-06.
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and thus great remedies are appropriate. Orfield knows the
intriguing and troubling demonstration many years ago by Thomas
Schelling.0 Schelling showed that relatively small preferences (for
example, that a few of one's nearby neighbors should be of one's
own ethnic or racial group) could, over time, have the consequence
of fully separating two groups." This consequence logically
follows from the fact that we are a mobile society, with approximate-
ly one-fifth of us moving every year. If even a minor degree of
racial preference affects our moves, these preferences aggregate
very rapidly to ghettoization.
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So the weight of responsibility, guilt, and wrong is much less
evident to me than in Orfield's presentation. Perhaps an extreme
racism requires an extreme remedy (I leave out for the moment the
political problem of how to get it if racism is that intense). But,
does a modest preference require it?
In addition, I disagree with Orfield's position on the Supreme
Court's decision in Milliken v. Bradley."3 In that case the Supreme
Court, as we know, refused to combine central city and suburb for
purposes of desegregation, even though the concentration of blacks
in the central city, existing or projected, made the creation of white
majority schools impossible. 4  Orfield argues with Thurgood
Marshall that the school district should have been enlarged to such
an extent that there was no feasible way for the parents who did not
want to send their children to the desegregated schools to es-
cape. 5 The existence of nearby school districts (how many miles?)
not subject to the desegregation plan meant the parents could move
away, evading the onus of integration.
I think this is to elevate the objective of integration, important
as it is, to a level that justifies almost any discomfort and incon-
venience for students, white or black. This remedy chases after the
whites on their way to the suburbs in order to create schools in
which blacks are a minority. In some places the school districts are
already very large, and the central city did not have to be combined
with suburban school districts to create white majority districts. For
example, this was the situation in 1970 in the Charlotte-
1" See Thomas C. Schelling, On the Ecology of Micromotives, 25 PUB. INTEREST 61
(1971).
11 See id. at 79-82.
12 See id.
13 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
14 See id. at 752-53.
"s See Orfield, Housing, supra note 1 (manuscript at 35-38).
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Mecklenburg school system which encompasses the city of Char-
lotte, North Carolina; n but in the large northern cities, the Court
refused to sanction such a remedy. 17 I believe the Court was right.
Whatever the good results in Charlotte-Mecklenburg County (and
I would like to know more about that), what would the results have
been in Detroit and Wayne County? However one plays it out, I see
conflict, vast inconvenience, and no great gains.
But having made his bow to these extreme and forceful
measures, which have always been politically unlikely and are now
even more unlikely, Orfield proposes at the end of his paper rather
narrower remedies, based on incentives to accept integration as
opposed to a judicial club to enforce it by requiring school
busing.'" Here he has some very interesting stories to tell, and I
would like to know more about them. In Louisville, white neighbor-
hoods were told, if you let in more blacks, you will have naturally
desegregated schools, and your children won't have to submit to
distant busing.'9 In New Jersey and Massachusetts, court order or
legislation requires communities to allow a certain number of
subsidized and low-cost units to be built, which will naturally
integrate the schools by integrating the communities. 20  In the
Chicago area, many black families have been assisted, following the
Gautreaux litigation, in moving into suburbs with very few minori-
ties.21 These seem reasonable approaches to me. I do wonder
how much they cost-they involve small-scale remedies, such as
erecting one very small development after another or moving in
families one by one. They require careful selection, counseling, and
generally extensive litigation. They strike me as costly programs,
and it is hard to believe they can produce large changes in the
distribution of the races, but the results may justify the costs.
I end with two questions. So much of this story takes us back to
the 1970s, when the major cases that set the pattern on school
desegregation for large cities were decided. The country is now
transformed by immigration, an immigration that is composed of
eighty-five percent Hispanics and Asians.22 What does this do to
16 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1970)
(describing the system's 550-square-mile area).
17 See, e.g., Milliken, 418 U.S. at 752-53.
18 See Orfield, Housing, supra note 1 (manuscript at 67-87).
" See id. (manuscript at 68-70).
21 See id. (manuscript at 74-76).
21 See id. (manuscript at 70-71).
' SeeJeffrey S. Passel & Barry Edmonston, Immigration and Race: Recent Trends
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the integration story? A Chinese family in San Francisco is now
suing for the right of its child to attend a neighborhood school.
23
A 1983 desegregation order requires that the child attend another
school because no single ethnic-racial group (the judge has
distinguished nine!) may make up more than forty percent of any
school.24 What possible sense can an order based on the demogra-
phy of 1983, itself based on earlier desegregation orders aimed at
alleviating black concentration, make for the San Francisco of 1995,
transformed by waves of immigration? Shouldn't this affect our
thinking about desegregation, which is, after all, an issue for
African-Americans? Asians don't want it, and the varied Hispanic
groups don't, in general, have any interest in it (instead, they want
bilingualism or better education or fewer dropouts-I think
integration comes much farther down on their list of concerns).
And a second question. The cities for a while became more
black and are now becoming more diverse. The black percentage
in our major cities is for the most part no longer increasing. In
some, it is declining, under the impact of immigration. Blacks are
nowjoining in large numbers the white movement toward suburbia.
Does this voluntary movement, undertaken without public carrots,
offer any hope for a less painful and costly means of integration?
Or is this simply another stage in ghetto expansion? There are
many questions to be answered here, but it is possible that after so
many decades a greater measure of integration is on the way.
in Immigration to the United States, in IMMIGRATION AND ETHNICITY: THE INTEGRATION
OF AMERICA'S NEWEST ARRIVALS 50 (Barry Edmonston &Jeffrey S. Passel eds., 1994)
(displaying U.S. population figures for 1990 by race).
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WK., Jan. 27, 1995, at 5, 8.
24 See id. at 5.
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